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ABSTRACT: Existing studies of the United Kingdom’s purchase of Trident D5 
missiles have simplified the Reagan administration’s sale. Using previously 
classified documentation, this article highlights the potential political and 
financial ramifications of a sale agreement, which led to complex deliberations 
within the Thatcher government up until the final day of negotiations. The 
White House viewed the sale as a means to strengthen Western nuclear and 
conventional forces to counter the perceived Soviet threat. However, even 
within this conducive environment, US officials still drove a hard bargain with 
their British counterparts, in order to support US strategic interests. Indeed, 
the White House utilised the sale to influence British defence policy. In this 
way, the Trident agreement was not a foregone conclusion but rather a 
continuation of the friendly, but not preordained, nature of US-UK nuclear 
relations, that has been renegotiated, according to the varying interests of 
both parties, throughout its existence.  
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In July 2016, the House of Commons voted to replace the submarine component of 
Britain’s Trident nuclear system. Thereafter, according to current estimates, the British 
government will need to take a decision in 2019 on the replacement of the Trident 
warhead, and then, in the following decade, a decision on procurement of new missiles to 
replace the current Trident D5s leased from the United States.1 Throughout all of these 
decisions, the United States will play a key role. The United Kingdom is technically 
dependent upon the United States for the supply of its nuclear delivery systems. However, 
despite the open debate of Trident renewal in Parliament and informed public discussion 
in various other forums, due to the secretive nature of nuclear diplomacy, the finer detail 
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of US-UK negotiations over Trident replacement will likely remain shrouded in secrecy 
until future declassification of archival records.  
 Due to the recent declassification of archival material in Britain and the United 
States, it is now possible to provide an in-depth analysis of the US-UK negotiations over 
the supply of Britain’s Trident D5 nuclear system over thirty years ago; the last time 
Britain replaced its nuclear force. Given the secrecy of US-UK negotiations on the supply 
of US delivery systems, such analysis is of historical and contemporary importance.  
 Hitherto, there has been little archival analysis of the Trident D5 negotiations. 
Subsequently, much of the existing literature stresses the aggressive stance of Reagan 
towards the Soviet Union and the friendship between Thatcher and Reagan as the 
underlying reason for the favourable terms that the British received on the purchase of 
the D5 missile.2 In recent years, there has been valuable new archival research on 
Britain’s decision-making on the replacement of Polaris.3 However, the Trident 
negotiations were bilateral in nature and thus a dynamic process. As such, a national 
approach is limited in the conclusions it can draw. In utilising original material from the 
British National Archives and the Ronald Reagan Library, this article incorporates both 
sides of the negotiations and thus builds upon previous analyses of the deal. Within its 
focus upon the bilateral negotiations, the article’s central theme is the role that the 
interests of the Reagan administration played in influencing and shaping the Trident 
negotiations. The second and interrelated theme is the ways in which the UK’s technical 
dependence on the US influenced British policymaking.  
Whilst nuclear decision-making is often conceived as being underpinned by the 
logic of deterrence, throughout the negotiations US officials were not overtly concerned 
with nuclear strategy or targeting.4 Whilst US officials saw the sale of Trident as a means 
to strengthen Western nuclear deterrence, they concurrently viewed the sale as a means 
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to reinforce the political and conventional strength of the Western alliance. For the US, 
the success of the latter depended upon the negotiated terms for the supply of Trident 
D5. As such, the issue of Britain’s conventional spending dominated negotiations.  
The British government remained uncertain, until the last day of formal talks, over 
the possible political and financial cost of the advanced missile system due to the Reagan 
White House’s attempts to utilise the sale as a means to influence British defence policy. 
An analysis of these negotiations reveals the extent to which the Thatcher government 
relied upon the forthcoming attitude of the US government in their efforts to replace 
Britain’s Polaris force, as well as the influence of the White House’s wider strategic, 
economic and political interests upon the sale itself. Due to the convergence of US-UK 
defence interests, the Reagan administration agreed to provide Trident D5 missiles at a 
substantially reduced cost. However, at the same time they utilised the sale to extract 
commitments from Britain on the maintenance of its conventional forces. As such, the 
Trident D5 agreement reinforced the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and 
thereby Reagan’s vision of a US-led Western alliance that could counter the Soviet Union 
through both nuclear and conventional strength. Moreover, just as Reagan’s hostility to 
social democracy shaped his foreign policy towards Latin America, it also influenced the 
administration’s approach to the sale of Trident D5 and the British Labour Party.5 
Given the secrecy of current US-UK negotiations over Trident renewal, these 
historical events are of particular contemporary relevance. As David Gill has recently 
demonstrated, historical debates have great utility for analysing present day nuclear 
strategy.6 In addition, the Trident D5 negotiations raise pertinent questions over the 
influence of the United States upon British decision-making, as well as the role that the 
British political elites’ belief in the necessity of an independent deterrent may play in 
Trident renewal in spite of strong counter-arguments.  
 
The British Dilemma 
In July 1980, the Thatcher government and the Carter administration agreed the US sale 
of Trident C4 missiles to replace Britain’s Polaris system. The British government 
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believed that they had secured the future of Britain’s nuclear force. However, in 
November 1980 Ronald Reagan won the US presidential election on a platform of US 
strategic modernisation. Subsequently, in August 1981, the Reagan administration 
decided that the US would replace the Trident C4 missile with the more advanced Trident 
D5 missile by 1989.7 Following this decision, Washington informed London that it was 
prepared to sell the D5, but did not provide any reassurances that it would supply the 
advanced missile on the same terms as the C4.8 The US decision on the D5 was of crucial 
importance to Britain’s effort to replace its Polaris nuclear system. Due to Britain’s 
technical dependence on the United States for nuclear missiles, the choice to replace 
Polaris was largely constrained to US delivery systems, lest the British choose to pursue 
more economically costly options. As such, in the autumn of 1981, following Ronald 
Reagan’s public announcement of his decision, the British government had to decide 
whether to proceed with Trident C4, and entail the risk of losing commonality with the 
US system, or upgrade to the D5 system and negotiate a new agreement with the US for 
the Polaris replacement.9  
 Neither option was ideal. If Britain procured the C4 whilst the United States Navy 
switched to Trident D5, it would entail a loss of commonality when the Americans phased 
the C4 out of service. In all likelihood, this would happen only a few years after British 
deployment of the new system. As such, if the British chose to stay with the C4, they risked 
spending huge sums to maintain the missiles. In 1967, the government of Harold Wilson 
opted not to purchase US Poseidon missiles but instead delayed a decision to upgrade the 
Polaris system by redirecting work at Aldermaston to the Super Antelope project, later 
named Chevaline, which would investigate improving the front-ends of the existing 
missiles.10 In 1973, Edward Heath, Wilson’s successor, decided to improve Polaris 
through the Super Antelope programme.11 Both the Wilson and Heath governments’ 
decisions to pursue the secret project were mainly due to the domestic political and 
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financial ramifications of the public purchase of a US delivery system.12 However, by 1981 
the astronomical costs of Britain’s Chevaline programme had provided the British 
government with a stark lesson on the potential costs of losing commonality with the 
US.13 The recent British discovery of the need to re-motor the existing Polaris rocket 
motors, following test-firing failures, had made the potential costs of losing commonality 
even more apparent to the Thatcher government.14 The estimated costs of this re-
motoring was £300 million, further straining the already stretched defence budget.15 
  The Reagan administration’s current offer of the Trident D5 system also came with 
drawbacks. Whilst the D5 offered better range and accuracy than the C4, this more 
advanced system came with an increased price tag. With the D5 still in the early stages of 
research and development, the extent of these extra costs was unpredictable. 
Furthermore, the D5’s capabilities were entirely disproportionate to Britain’s defence 
requirements.16 The Trident D5 was ‘not just a modernised C4… [but] a completely new 
missile.’17 Alongside the MX missile, the D5 was at the forefront of US ballistic missile 
technology.18 Subsequently, the proposed acquisition of such a costly and advanced 
weapon could fuel the arguments of those opposed to the replacement of Polaris on moral 
grounds, as well as those who feared that Trident would diminish Britain's conventional 
strength. Therefore, the American decision to upgrade to D5, left British ministers with a 
difficult dilemma over the replacement to the Polaris system.  
 The Reagan administration’s approach to the Cold War meant that it was in its 
perceived interests to negate the problems the purchase of Trident D5 could cause the 
British Conservative government. From 1981–1983, the US adopted a highly 
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confrontational policy towards the Soviet Union.19 In some ways, Reagan’s approach 
resembled President Jimmy Carter’s after he had hardened his policy towards the Soviet 
Union following its invasion of Afghanistan.20 However, Reagan had warned about the 
communist threat to US security for many years, and indeed long before his predecessor’s 
reappraisal. He believed, in contrast to many US policy-makers before him, that the Soviet 
Union’s desire for world communism meant it could not be appeased.21 As part of this, 
Ronald Reagan wanted the US and its western allies to strengthen their conventional and 
nuclear forces to thwart this perceived Soviet threat.22 Margaret Thatcher was supportive 
of this confrontational approach to the Cold War.23 Although budget restraints limited the 
Thatcher Government’s ability to strengthen the UK’s armed forces, they nonetheless 
prioritised the replacement of its Polaris system. Reagan’s concurrent belief in the need 
to strengthen Western forces provided the White House with an implicit rationale to 
support the British government’s endeavours.  
The Reagan administration’s approach to arms control also suggested that the 
supply of Trident D5 to the British would be readily forthcoming, in contrast to the early 
Carter administration.24 In 1981, the Reagan White House viewed arms control issues as 
a low priority. Throughout his election campaign, Reagan said he would reject the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II Treaty, arguing that it only bolstered the 
military imbalance. Instead, he planned to restore US defences in order to negotiate from 
a position of strength, and then seek deep reductions in nuclear arsenals.25 Reagan 
believed that in the meantime US arms control policy should seek to enhance ‘national 
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security by limiting Soviet systems most threatening to the US.’26 Subsequently, from 
1981-1983, the Reagan administration’s approach to arms control stymied progress. 
Instead of SALT II, in November 1981, the administration proposed the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks (START). The purported purpose of the talks was to reduce the overall 
number of strategic weapons in the superpowers’ arsenals. However, Reagan refused to 
begin negotiations until June 1982. Moreover, the administration proposed a cap on land-
based warheads that would have required the Soviets to destroy more than half of their 
arsenal, whilst allowing the US to increase its numbers. As Moscow relied primarily on 
land-based missiles for its ‘deterrent’, reducing them by half would have weakened its 
position vis-à-vis the West.27 Given the administration’s confrontational rhetoric and 
military build-up, the one-sided proposal appeared disingenuous. Understandably, the 
Soviets rejected the proposal, calling it a ‘propaganda ploy.’28 With such an approach on 
arms control, the Reagan administration was unconcerned about the affect of the supply 
of the D5 on US-Soviet arms control efforts. Nevertheless, despite this convergence of 
interests, in the autumn of 1981 the Reagan administration did not offer the British any 
reassurance over the possible terms of supply of the D5. Indeed, US officials had 
previously made clear to the Thatcher government that they would expect conventional 
commitments in exchange for any reduction in the price of Trident.29 
On 25 June 1981, the Thatcher government announced extensive cost cutting and 
restructuring of Britain’s military forces, which would reduce the army, navy and civilian 
defence work force. The Thatcher government viewed these changes as a necessary 
reallocation to key strategic areas in light of increased costs, rather than cuts to Britain’s 
defence spending.30 The Trident programme was one of the areas that the Thatcher 
government wished to fund.31 Although it was a means to raise funds for Trident, news 
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of the British Defence Review provoked US concern.32 The White House did not view the 
replacement of Polaris as the only key strategic area for the UK’s defence budget. Reagan 
officials believed that, in order to meet the global challenge of the Soviet Union, the 
Western alliance needed to build both strategic and conventional capabilities. In 
particular, Caspar Weinberger, US Secretary of Defence, thought that nuclear strength 
was no substitute for conventional forces in vital regions, such as the Persian Gulf.33 
Indeed, Washington did not want to have to spend even more on defence because of allied 
withdrawals. In June 1981, Weinberger met with John Nott, UK Defence Secretary, to 
discuss concerns over the British Defence Review.34 In this meeting, the US Secretary of 
Defence suggested several ideas, including ‘greater US support for the Trident 
programme’, which could ease Britain’s financial pressures, and thus limit the need for 
conventional cuts.35 Weinberger and Nott agreed to the establishment of a US-UK 
working group for detailed discussions on salient defence areas affected by budgetary 
restrictions. However, in the first two US-UK Defence Co-operation Working Group 
meetings American officials stressed that they desired defence commitments, 
particularly on naval deployment outside of the NATO area, in return for a reduction in 
the research and development (R&D) levy for Trident.36  
The R&D levy offered the White House a subtle means to influence British defence 
policy. The 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) included a five percent R&D surcharge 
on the purchase price of each missile in recognition of the research and development 
costs the US had already incurred. The Kennedy White House decided to charge the 
British for R&D in order to ensure that the sale was viewed as part of a partnership rather 
than a ‘charitable contract’, as they felt the original Skybolt deal had been, and as a means 
to develop greater cost-sharing within NATO.37 The levy was not set pro rata of US 
spending on R&D due to concurrent awareness that the more Britain spent on its nuclear 
force, the less it had to spend on its conventional forces.38 However, since 1976, US 
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regulations stipulated that the government had to charge a R&D levy on a pro rata basis. 
The President could only approve a reduction in the R&D charge if he believed this was 
in the wider interests of the US. The conduct of US officials in the US/UK Defence Co-
operation Working Group meetings strongly suggested that the Reagan administration 
was prepared to use this leverage over the R&D levy to extract certain conventional 
commitments from the British. As a UK official commented after the meetings, ‘There is 
no doubt that what the Americans are engaged in is an attempt to introduce alterations 
into the defence programme… in exchange for financial savings in the Trident 
programme… and to ensure a continued RN [Royal Navy] presence in areas important to 
the US.’39 
 In spite of a convergence in defence interests and early indications that 
Washington welcomed British procurement of the D5 rather than C4, a new Trident 
agreement favourable to the British government was far from a foregone conclusion. 
Indeed, David Gillmore, head of the Defence Department at the British Foreign Office, sent 
a stark warning to a number of British officials in September 1981: ‘As I think you agree, 
we clearly need to be extremely cautious lest at the end of the day we find the Americans 
making some pretty excessive demands of us as a quid pro quo.’40 Undoubtedly, when 
British minsters met to decide whether to proceed with the C4 or upgrade to the D5, 
imprecision and uncertainty clouded their decision-making.  
 
MISC 7  
On 24 November 1981, a British Cabinet committee made up of a select group of 
ministers, titled MISC 7 (Miscellaneous 7), met to make a decision on whether the 
successor to Polaris should be the Trident D5 rather than C4. This group had been 
established in May 1979 to decide upon the replacement of Polaris as well as related 
nuclear issues. The group consisted of Margaret Thatcher and the four Department 
Ministers concerned with the decision: the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the 
Home Secretary, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.41 As had occurred repeatedly in 
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the history of Britain’s nuclear programme, decision-making on the replacement to 
Polaris was limited to a very small circle.42   
When this select group met in November 1981, ministers still did not know the 
terms of supply for D5, whether the US would offer them a reduction in its price, or the 
commitments that the US would expect from Britain in return. Notwithstanding, John 
Nott remained seemingly impervious to any doubt about the necessity of D5 acquisition. 
To begin the meeting, Nott expressed his belief that Reagan’s decision to cease 
deployment of Trident C4 as early as 1998 ‘meant that it would no longer be sensible for 
the United Kingdom to acquire the C4, since it would become unique to the United 
Kingdom almost from the outset of its deployment on British boats in 1994.’43 Instead, 
Nott recommended that Britain procure a Trident D5 four-boat force. As Nott’s 
memorandum to MISC 7 on the D5 proposal acknowledged, until the British undertook 
‘detailed discussions… with the US authorities’ it would be ‘impossible to predict with 
precise accuracy what a UK D5 system would cost.’44 However, Nott remained optimistic. 
Due to the Reagan administration’s desire to help the British with pressures on their 
defence budget, Nott believed that the Americans would offer a reduced price for the D5, 
and maybe even a R&D levy less than the five percent charge for the Polaris and Trident 
C4 sales agreements.45 
 Other British officials deemed Nott’s optimistic appraisal too simplistic, believing 
that it overlooked many significant difficulties. As Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong 
highlighted to Thatcher, Nott’s proposal glossed over the ‘very great uncertainties in the 
costings of a D5 force.’46 Even if the British were able to secure reductions from the 
administration, they still faced the risk of a huge escalation in eventual costs due to the 
unforeseen difficulties that invariably emerge during defence development projects. The 
estimates of the C4 programme had already increased in real terms by 20 percent since 
MISC 7 had decided to purchase the missile.47 These increases had occurred in spite of 
the C4 missile being at an advanced stage of development. With the D5 system still in its 
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early stages of development, the ultimate costs remained unknown, but there was clearly 
a real potential for cost escalation to go far beyond the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) 
current estimates.48 Given the increase in the costs of Trident to ‘increasingly formidable 
proportions,’ MOD financial staff, and even the Chiefs of Staff, were ‘increasingly restive 
about the potential impact of Trident for other parts of the defence programme.’49  
The increased costs of the D5 system compared to the C4 could also be likely to 
have problematic political ramifications for the Thatcher government. At this moment in 
time, the cost of Britain’s nuclear programme was particularly contentious after Francis 
Pym, Nott’s predecessor, revealed the existence of the secret Chevaline programme with 
an estimated cost of about £1000 million to Parliament on 24 January 1980.50 Amongst 
the British public, their government’s agreement to base Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Force (INF) missiles in the country was also extremely controversial.51 The increased 
capability and costs of D5 would likely embolden the opposition Labour Party and a 
growing anti-nuclear movement to aggressively campaign against an expensive 
modernisation of Britain’s strategic nuclear forces, beyond the country’s need, while the 
welfare state faced severe cuts. According to opinion polls a majority of the country, 
ranging from 48 percent to 61 percent, opposed INF deployment.52  
Much of the opposition to the government’s nuclear policy focused on the decision 
to station US cruise missiles in the UK rather than the acquisition of Trident C4. The public 
believed cruise missiles to be ‘a new and substantial addition to Western nuclear 
capability’53; whilst they viewed Trident as a ‘continuation of the existing British four-
boat deterrent force.’54 However, with the greater capability of the D5, opposition to it 
amongst the British public was more likely. Moreover, if the Thatcher government did 
not secure a substantially reduced price for the D5, it could be difficult for them to present 
the upgrade as a necessary cost-saving choice. Instead, opponents to Trident could more 
forcefully argue that the government took the decision in order to increase the country’s 
nuclear capability. If the British public believed the acquisition of D5 was an increase in 
                                                          
48TNA, PREM 19/694, Armstrong to Thatcher, ‘The United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent MISC 7 (81) 1’, 23 
Nov. 1981. 
49TNA, FCO 46/2751, Weston to Acland, ‘C4/D5’, 2 Oct. 1981. 
50Hansard, vol.977, cols. 681-683, Mr Francis Pym, 24 Jan. 1980.  
51See K. Stoddart, ‘Creating the “Seamless Robe of Deterrence”,’ in The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the 
Cold War, ed. L. Nuti et al. (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2015), 176-195. 
52See M.E. Guasconi, ‘Public Opinion and the Euromissile Crisis’, in The Euromissile Crisis, 273. 
53TNA, FCO 46/2750, Gillmore to Acland, ‘Trident Public Attitudes’, 5 Feb. 1981. 
54Ibid. 
12 
 
nuclear capability rather than the ‘replacement’ of Polaris, this could fuel opposition to 
Trident and cruise missile deployment, as well as boost support for Labour’s 
disarmament policies.55 A decision to upgrade to D5 could also increase opposition from 
those on the traditional right, nominally supportive of Britain’s nuclear programme, who 
might argue that the increased costs of D5 would ‘cause further detriment to the UK’s 
conventional forces.’56  
Proceeding with the C4 could also create political problems. US-UK renegotiation 
of the C4 agreement was now necessary because of the cost increases of the system, due 
to Reagan’s strategic modernisation decision and exchange rate movements.57 The 
subsequent public announcement would draw attention to the system’s higher price than 
originally stated. Moreover, the inevitable chattering of defence analysts could make the 
tricky public presentation of a new C4 deal more difficult by highlighting that costs were 
likely to increase further due to the loss of commonality with the US. Once again, all this 
could contribute to anti-Trident sentiment in sections of the British public.  
Subsequently, all ministers present at the MISC 7 meeting, bar John Nott, were 
hesitant to make a decision on the successor to Polaris due to fears about the financial 
and political costs of both options. Francis Pym, now Lord President of the Council, 
‘worried that the proposed switch from C4 to the even more powerful D5 missile would 
adversely affect both public opinion today and the attitude of whatever government 
emerges from the next elections.’58 Lord Carrington, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary, ‘shared these worries, and was also concerned at the greater difficulty of 
keeping a D5 force out of future arms control negotiations.’59 As such, in a policy clearly 
driven by the possible political ramifications of opting for an advanced system rather 
than financial concerns, Carrington favoured staying with C4 for the moment, and 
switching to the D5 later. These political ramifications also concerned Geoffrey Howe, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, but his greater fear was the potential costs of losing 
commonality with the US. He therefore supported adoption of the D5 but preferred only 
12 missile tubes per boat, even though it only offered a small saving. Thatcher though was 
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concerned about the increased financial outlay of the D5 and feared that the ‘costs of D5 
were uncertain and likely to escalate well beyond the present estimate.’60 Finally, and 
most dramatically, William Whitelaw, Home Secretary, ‘accepted the case for D5 against 
the other alternatives, but felt that the choice with which Ministers were faced raised a 
still more fundamental question: whether the United Kingdom could afford to continue 
to maintain an independent strategic nuclear deterrent.’61  
 After extensive discussion about the problematic choice British ministers faced, 
the meeting ran out of time, and with no clear solution to the predicament, the discussion 
finished on a cliff-hanger: ‘Despite the enormous difficulties involved it might become 
necessary to consider the possibility of Britain ceasing to be a nuclear power.’62 With no 
time to consider this dramatic statement, Thatcher wrapped up the meeting: due to 
‘insufficient time on this occasion for Ministers to take any decision’, and she suggested 
that, ‘A whole day should be devoted to collective ministerial consideration.’63 The 
uncertainty about the costs of the D5 system had impeded MISC 7’s decision-making. This 
hesitation by MISC 7 over the future of Britain’s nuclear programme, and indeed its future 
as a nuclear power, was remarkable. In May 1979, when MISC 7 first met to discuss the 
successor to Polaris there had been no discussion on whether the system should be 
replaced.64 This reflected the British elites’ belief in the necessity of an independent 
deterrent since the end of the Second World War.65 Subsequently, the doubts of MISC 7 
in 1981 demonstrate the severe political and financial ramifications they foresaw if they 
chose either of their two options.  
Ironically, the British notion of an independent deterrent rested upon a high level 
of transatlantic technical dependence. In order to solve their dilemma over the future of 
Britain’s nuclear programme, the British government needed the Americans to offer a 
very favourable price for the D5. A substantial reduction in price could help mitigate the 
associated political risks MISC 7 ministers foresaw in opting for the expensive system. 
British ministers needed Nott’s hope – namely that they could persuade the Americans to 
offer better terms than that of the Trident C4 agreement – to become reality. For the 
moment, with a lack of any assurance from the US about the price of D5, British ministers 
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remained uncertain about the costs, thus delaying the Polaris replacement programme. 
Underpinning the problem was Britain’s dependency on the US for the provision of its 
nuclear capability: they had to take or leave whatever the United States offered, and this 
uncertainty could evidently complicate decision-making.  
 
Inherent Belief 
The Reagan administration held a deep interest in stemming the domestic financial and 
political ramifications that the D5 upgrade could cause the Thatcher government. As 
discussed, Reagan believed that the restoration of a ‘satisfactory military balance’ with 
the Soviet Union was an imperative.66 Moreover, the White House was deeply concerned 
about the political situation in Britain and the possibility that the Labour Party could 
defeat the Conservatives in the next general election with disastrous consequences for 
the US’s strategic interests.  
Margaret Thatcher had been elected in 1979 promising a renewal of Britain’s 
beleaguered economy through a programme of economic liberalisation. However, by the 
time of Reagan’s election, many had judged the economic policies of the Thatcher 
government to be a disaster. Unemployment had soared to ten percent, workers in the 
public sector were threatening to strike, and inflationary problems persisted.67 By 
January 1981, Thatcher’s political popularity had been somewhat eroded. With the next 
election due by May 1984, political commentators predicted that, if there was no reversal 
in the economic downturn by late 1982 or 1983, Thatcher could find herself ousted as 
leader of the Conservative Party.68 Thatcher’s precarious political situation inevitably 
affected her government’s ability to offer its usual unwavering support for US policy. 
Subsequently, in July 1981, John Louis, US ambassador to Britain, warned that the 
administration, ‘Must prepare… for a period in which we shall have difficulty counting 
fully on our usually staunchest ally, even as Thatcher will be clutching our coattails.’69  
In addition, Thatcher’s political woes worried Washington because it meant that a 
Labour victory or a Labour-led coalition in the next election looked increasingly likely; a 
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result that would not be conducive to the administration’s interests. Following its 1979 
electoral defeat, Labour became embroiled in a bitter internal struggle over policies and 
control of the party itself.70 These developments had serious ramifications for the 
direction of Labour’s defence policies. Many within the party, especially on the left, had 
strong reservations about the purchase of Trident, opposed US cruise missiles based in 
Britain, and favoured cuts in defence spending.71 With many on the right of the Labour 
Party now defecting to the Social Democratic Party – recently set-up by four former 
Labour Cabinet members dubbed the ‘Gang of Four’ – and the ‘radical’ left in ascendance, 
it seemed likely that a Labour government would adopt defence policies that were 
antithetical to Washington’s aims.72 As Alexander Haig, US Secretary of State, told Reagan 
in February 1981, ‘The policies being expounded by the [Labour] left, which is ascendant, 
would seriously detract from the UK's role in NATO.’73 The chances of the Labour Party 
securing a parliamentary majority with such an ideological programme were doubtful; 
such policies would be ‘hard for some in the party to swallow, let alone the wider 
public.’74 However, even as a minority government, the Labour Party presented a real 
threat to Reagan’s foreign policy interests and were ‘capable of touching off a European 
slide down the anti-nuclear chute.’75 Nevertheless, despite the convergence of strategic 
and political interests, Reagan officials did not offer the Conservative government any 
firm reassurance over the price of Trident D5 ahead of the next MISC 7 meeting.76  
 
On 12 January 1982, MISC 7 met again to decide on the successor to Polaris.77 Despite 
continued uncertainty over the D5’s terms of sale, Armstrong briefed Thatcher that he 
did not think ministers would decide to give up Britain’s nuclear weapons: ‘The political 
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as well as the military implications of coming out are so tremendous that your colleagues 
are likely to conclude that we should stay in.’78  
Armstrong was right. The British elites’ belief in the necessity of a bomb with a 
‘Union Jack flying on top of it’, again won out.79 Once the formal MISC 7 discussion began, 
there was a consensus that Britain should continue to maintain an ‘independent’ nuclear 
deterrent.80 Ministers then agreed that the Trident D5 should be the successor to Polaris, 
due to the ‘lessons of the Chevaline project.’81 However, many of the MISC 7 ministers 
were still concerned about the potential costs of the D5. As such, they decided that its 
procurement should be ‘subject to three provisos’: that the British should partake in 
negotiations with the US to ‘determine the broad terms on which the new system could 
be procured’; then Cabinet would take a final decision; with the choice between a four or 
three-boat force ‘left open for the time being.’82 This final consideration highlighted that 
the ministers believed it was ‘a matter for concern that the likely cost of the Trident 
project had already risen sharply in real terms since its inception in 1980 and that the 
price might well rise further because of American decisions over which Britain would 
have no control.’83 As such, despite the financial and political constraints, the British 
government was reluctant to consider any security alternatives. However, as the three 
provisos made clear, the attitude of the US government would be crucial in Britain’s 
endeavour to maintain its nuclear programme.  
 
First Round of Negotiations 
As they planned for the Trident D5 negotiations, the MOD was optimistic that the British 
government could secure a reduced price for Trident D5, even hoping that they ‘may be 
able to achieve an even better deal’ than the already ‘advantageous’ Polaris Sales 
Agreement.84 Their optimism arose from indications emanating from the US Executive 
branch that they wished for the United Kingdom to remain ‘in the strategic deterrent 
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business’, although they were concerned that this should not lead to reduction in Britain’s 
conventional forces.85 However, as US officials had indicated in US-UK Defence Co-
operation meetings, although seemingly overlooked by the MOD, the administration 
would not reduce their calculations for the R&D levy from a pro rata basis without 
securing British commitments in return. Indeed, the Reagan negotiators meticulously 
planned their strategy from the outset, seeking to derive certain British conventional 
commitments. On 6 February 1982, Alexander Haig and Frank Carlucci, US Deputy 
Secretary of Defence, wrote to inform the President of their intended negotiation 
strategy. US officials would seek a reciprocal deal, where, in return for providing the 
British with a cut-price missile system, they would ask their British counterparts to make 
commitments in geostrategic areas of concern.86 Ergo, the Reagan administration’s 
conception of Western strategic interests, in particular Britain’s conventional force 
contribution, was omnipresent in their negotiating strategy.  
 The R&D levy was the main area of contention. Primarily, the Reagan team 
intended to offer an arrangement similar to the C4 agreement, where the US would forego 
25 percent of the pro rata R&D levy, receive 25 percent in currency, and the remainder in 
offsets. Haig and Carlucci told Reagan that, ‘The effect of this would be to approximately 
double both what the UK will pay for R&D, and what we will forgive.’87 Thus, the Reagan 
team planned to utilise British technical dependence to extract a series of quid pro quos, 
or ‘offsets’, in exchange for reducing British costs. The ‘offsets’ that the US negotiators 
sought would: 
Fall in two important areas in which the British are cutting forces and we 
would otherwise have to take up the slack: Maintaining surface naval forces 
in the North Atlantic, and peacetime presence in the Indian Ocean. If the 
British agree to do more than they had planned in these two areas, it will save 
the U.S. Government money and bolster Western defenses.88  
The negotiators’ strategy demonstrates a clear effort to reduce the price of the D5 system 
not only to ensure Britain’s continuation as a nuclear power but also to derive military 
commitments in other significant strategic areas. Reagan officials, in a manner similar to 
various US governments before them, would take a hard-nosed approach to the US-UK 
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partnership in order to manoeuvre Britain’s defence strategy in line with their own 
strategic vision to counter the Soviet Union.89 
 
On 8-9 February 1982, US and UK negotiators held the first round of Trident D5 talks. 
Reflective of their administration’s concern not to increase anti-nuclear sentiment in 
Britain, US negotiators were, immediately, forthcoming on the British request for ‘offsets’. 
British arms manufacturers had voiced significant dissatisfaction in response to the C4 
agreement due to the resultant UK defence expenditure in the United States. British 
manufacturers had also expressed fears that the purchase of Trident could lead to a 
downturn in conventional arms sales.90 The UK government feared that the purchase of 
Trident D5 could augment these criticisms within its domestic arms industry due to the 
increased cost of the system and a higher proportion of UK military expenditure destined 
for the United States.91 As such, British officials wished to secure US agreement that if 
they purchased D5, UK ‘firms should be given a fair crack of the whip as regards sub-
contracts from within the whole United States Trident programme.’92 US officials were 
immediately ‘receptive’ to this idea.93 US negotiators were also forthcoming on two of the 
surcharges Britain was liable to pay. On the issue of overheads, the Americans said that 
they could waive the minimum charge, which they estimated to be $106 million at 1982 
prices. On the facilities charge, the US negotiators said they were ‘Prepared to 
contemplate waiving the facilities charge, which they put at $51 million.’ The British 
viewed these concessions as ‘satisfactory.’94 
However, as Robert Wade-Gery, lead negotiator on the British side, reported to 
Downing Street, the US thinking on the third surcharge, R&D, was, ‘less forthcoming than 
we [the British] had hoped.’95 The US officials told their British counterparts, that they 
started from their legal obligation to calculate the levy on a pro rata basis. Calculated at 
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1981 prices, this would amount to $685 million. The Reagan team regarded 
approximately half that amount as offset by costs incurred by the British from their 
agreement during the C4 negotiations to pay operational costs for Rapier air defence 
systems on US bases in the UK. In 1980, after prolonged negotiations, US and UK officials 
came to an agreement that Britain would pay a five percent R&D surcharge on its 
purchase of Trident C4 missiles and provide personnel for the Rapier defences, instead 
of payment of R&D on a pro rata basis.96 This British commitment to provide personnel 
still stood.97 However, the Reagan administration now argued that the increased costs of 
the D5 meant that this deal still left $342 million of the pro rata R&D levy unpaid. The 
Americans said they would be willing to waive $120 million, with the British paying $222 
million. On hearing this offer, British officials: 
Made clear that this basis for R&D calculations would be wholly unacceptable 
in London. Under the deal struck publicly in July 1980, we undertook to pay 
their Rapier manning costs; and we were abiding by that. In return, they 
undertook to fix the Trident R&D levy not at a pro rata level but on a 5 per cent 
basis (as with Polaris).98  
 
Discussions on the R&D levy dominated the second day of negotiation, and by the day’s 
end, there were ‘outlines of a possible settlement.’99 Subsequently, Wade-Gery reported 
to London that he believed that the US could be persuaded to levy a five percent surcharge 
on the lines agreed for Polaris and C4. However, US negotiators indicated that such a 
reduction would necessitate conventional commitments, due to the need to consider 
Congressional reaction; the administration would have to seek Congressional approval 
for any Trident agreement not charged on a pro rata basis. Therefore, if the 
administration offered the British a reduction on the R&D levy, ‘their basic approach to 
Congress’ would need to be that money the British were ‘not forced to pay for R&D will 
be money available for… [their] conventional defence effort.’100 Kristan Stoddart 
subsequently emphasises that this need to appease congress was why the R&D levy was 
the ‘big sticking point.’101 
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 However, whilst US negotiators stressed to British officials that these ‘quids’ were 
to appease Congress, material from the US archives suggests that this was not the whole 
truth. The Reagan White House also sought these ‘quids’ in order to gain, at least some, 
assistance with their own areas of interest. As previously discussed, when Haig and 
Carlucci informed Reagan of their planned strategy they told the President that they 
wished for offsets in ‘important areas’ where, otherwise, the US would ‘have to take up 
the slack.’102 Subsequently, after the first round of talks, the US negotiators reported to 
Reagan that they believed their relatively tough approach meant that the British would 
now consider the quid pro quos that the US desired:  
We offered the British an arrangement for the purchase of the missiles similar 
to that agreed two years ago for the TRIDENT (C-4) missile. Predictably, they 
told us the price we offered was higher than they wished to pay. However, they 
agreed to propose to us additional offsets (i.e., increases in their own defense 
posture in areas where we would otherwise have to assume responsibility 
ourselves) which could make up at least some of the difference.103  
 
In pushing for these offsets, US negotiators took advantage of British vulnerability 
in the negotiations, as they had ‘no real option except to go for D5.’104 Although the US 
government held a significant interest in maintaining Britain’s nuclear status, it still 
sought to secure the greatest possible assistance in conventional areas. In spite of a clear 
convergence of interests, a formal alliance, and a long-standing ‘special relationship’, the 
US would still seek to derive the greatest possible benefit from the negotiations, which it 
viewed as a key part of any final agreement. Haig and Carlucci informed Reagan that they 
expected the US and UK negotiators to hammer out a reciprocal deal through 
compromise: ‘We do not anticipate that we will be able to complete the negotiations at 
next week’s session. We will make our first offer, the British will make theirs, followed by 
some clarifying discussions.’105 As such, the Reagan team planned to push the British on 
the R&D levy as much as possible, in order to extract reasonable commitments from them. 
Subsequently, US officials were happy with the first round of negotiations. They were 
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‘optimistic’ that in the next round, two weeks away, ‘that we [the US] can bridge the 
differences between us.’106 
In the interim, the MOD began ‘considering urgently what limited adjustments to 
the conventional defence programme’ the British could offer to secure reductions on the 
R&D levy.107 The British needed to be resourceful in finding room for manoeuvre, 
although as Wade-Gery commented: ‘They would need to be compatible with British 
interests; and of course self-balancing, since our available resources are already fully 
committed.’108 In the next round of talks, the British planned to present a list of these 
possible adjustments and to clarify that these changes were dependent on US assistance 
with the Trident surcharges. The British would use this approach to ‘confirm waiver of 
the D-5 facilities charge; to accept that consideration of the level of R and D levy should 
start from the basis of a 5 per cent levy… to move downwards from there; and to end up 
with a fixed rather than a percentage figure.’109 The British expected to succeed in at least 
the first two of these aims, and if the Americans were unwilling or unable to give the final 
two, the British would limit the extent of their conventional adjustments. Such a strategy, 
Robert Wade-Gery believed, would enable the British ‘To establish the real limits of what 
they think they can get through Congress.’110 
 
Second Round of Negotiations 
The second round of negotiations took place on 24-5 February 1982. By the end of the 
first day, the two sides had agreed everything except the elusive R&D figure. During the 
course of the day, US negotiators were again, in most areas, inclined to be helpful and 
negate any political problems that a Trident D5 deal could cause the Thatcher 
government. Throughout discussions on surcharges, US officials were conscious of the 
need to give the British a presentable deal that could provoke as little political trouble as 
possible. On the overheads charge, which, for legal reasons, had to remain a percentage 
on the same basis as in the Polaris and C4 agreements, the Americans were ‘content to 
follow precedent and not mention this in the published exchanges.’111 Once again, the US 
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and UK government would not reveal the full price of Britain’s nuclear programme to the 
public. US officials also confirmed the waiver of the facilities charge. Moreover, they 
agreed that the R&D levy would be a fixed sum rather than a sliding percentage.112 This 
vital concession would shield the British from potential cost escalation, with the US 
absorbing all cost increases. This would greatly assist with the public presentation of the 
new Trident agreement, and would help ensure the future viability of Britain’s nuclear 
and conventional forces by minimising the risk of escalation in costs. 
The reductions given by the Reagan administration on these surcharges 
demonstrated its clear support for Britain’s nuclear and conventional forces, as well as 
an attempt to suppress domestic opposition in Britain to the deal. Nevertheless, the US 
negotiators continued to play hardball over the extent of the fixed R&D levy. In response 
to the British list of possible adjustments to their defence dilemmas, US officials 
expressed their dissatisfaction; they ‘rightly perceived’ that most of these ‘additional’ 
deployments were, ‘no more than we [the British] could have been assumed to be 
planning to do anyway.’113 US negotiators then began to press ‘strongly for some 
additional commitments in areas that would respond to current congressional 
preoccupations.’114 With the British seemingly outmanoeuvred, the Americans now laid 
out their desire for Britain to retain HMS Invincible and delay its military departure from 
Belize.  
As Haig and Carlucci had informed Reagan before negotiations began, US officials 
wished to utilise the Trident sale to secure British commitments in geostrategic areas of 
concern, where otherwise the US ‘would… have to take up the slack.’115 The US request 
for Britain to retain the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible reflected the administration’s 
concerns about reductions in the United Kingdom’s surface strength. As previously 
discussed, the Reagan administration thought that nuclear strength was no substitute for 
conventional forces in vital regions, such as the Persian Gulf, and that a build-up in 
strategic and conventional capabilities was necessary to counter perceived Soviet 
aggression. Subsequently, alongside their strategic modernisation, the Reagan 
administration planned to increase the navy’s surface strength by approximately 30 
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percent.116 The benefits of this investment in the US navy would obviously be negated if 
the British cut their surface vessels, and the US had to fill the void; at this time, Britain 
contributed 70 percent of NATO’s total surface fleet in the Eastern Atlantic.117 As 
discussed, Weinberger had spoken to Nott about US concerns over Britain’s proposed 
cuts in surface vessels in August.118 By requesting the retention of HMS Invincible, the 
administration sought to use the Trident negotiations as a means to influence British 
policy in this area. 
Similar geostrategic concerns directed the US negotiators’ request that Britain 
retain all, or at least some, of their existing combat forces in Belize for a further five 
years.119 As part of the Thatcher government’s efforts to end the financial burden of its 
remaining colonies, they had decided to grant Belize independence by the end of 1981 
and at the same time withdraw all combat forces.120 Given Reagan’s fears over the ‘threat’ 
of communism spreading throughout this part of South America, the White House 
disliked the British plans.121 The UK government had decided to withdraw in spite of 
Guatemala’s claim to Belize. As such, Reagan officials feared that ‘failure to settle the 
dispute now could lead to tensions between Guatemala and Belize, invite Cuban 
intervention and contribute to regional destabilisation.’122 In addition, Washington 
feared British withdrawal would hinder US efforts to suppress the perceived communist 
threat in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and stem contagion across Latin America.123 
Subsequently, the administration sought to utilise the Trident sale as a means to ensure 
Britain’s support in its ideological crusades in the Caribbean.  
Understandably, British officials pushed back over these US attempts to influence 
UK defence policy. In response to the US request to retain Invincible, Robert Wade-Gery 
told the US officials that they expected the Australian government to announce their plans 
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to purchase the aircraft carrier the next day; there was ‘no way’ the British ‘could now 
dishonour that offer.’124 The Americans ‘regretfully accepted this.’125 Wade-Gery then 
revealed the possibility of a reprieval for the amphibious assault ships HMS Fearless and 
HMS Intrepid. Due to the valuable contribution of these landing crafts to NATO capability, 
US officials replied ‘that this was the sort of thing they were looking for.’126  
Wade-Gery gave the request on Belize short shrift, telling the US team ‘They 
should not… be under any mis-apprehension about our room for manoeuvre. A decision 
to station British combat forces for a prolonged period in a third world country would be 
a major departure in policy. I saw little chance of this being acceptable.’127 However, in 
his attempts to reach a compromise, Wade-Gery raised ‘two less far-reaching 
possibilities.’128 The first was the expansion of the training programme that the British 
planned to provide to the Belize defence forces after the withdrawal of their combat 
forces. The second was a short extension, by a matter of a few months, in the length of 
time that British combat forces would remain in Belize. Unknown to the US officials, the 
British were already considering this second possibility.129 These suggestions produced 
a mixed response from the Americans; Robert McFarlane, Deputy National Security 
Advisor, replied that there might be ‘promise’ in the first option, but ‘he gave no sign’ that 
the second option would be of interest. US negotiators then, ‘Pressed for an assurance 
that a regular British naval presence (e.g. one frigate) would be maintained in the 
Caribbean for the next five years.’ In response, Wade-Gery, explained, ‘That ship 
deployments are not normally planned in such detail so far ahead, but undertook to have 
the point considered as sympathetically as possible.’130  
With no firm agreement on additional British deployments, the first day of the 
second round of negotiations ended with the final amount of the R&D levy still 
unresolved. The issue would ‘be hammered out in hard bargaining’ the next day in light 
of Britain’s final position on deployment. As such, after the day’s discussions Wade-Gery 
sent an urgent telegraph to John Nott: ‘In order to negotiate the lowest possible R&D 
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figure tomorrow,’ he needed to say ‘as much as possible’ in response to the specific 
requests made by the US officials.131 Wade-Gery subsequently asked John Nott if he could 
acquiesce to the desired US procedure on retention of Fearless and Intrepid, and if they 
could offer any private reassurances about how long they would retain them. He also 
enquired if there was anything they could offer the Americans on Belize that could ‘be at 
least dressed up as an addition to current plans,’ and the likely level of British naval 
presence in the Caribbean over the next five years.132 Wade-Gery acknowledged the 
flurry of activity that his telegram would provoke, but he believed a well-considered 
response was essential in securing a favourable deal. He stated, ‘I well realize how 
difficult this will be and that short-notice consultation between Ministers may be 
needed… but anything that can be done while the iron is hot here will clearly be reflected 
in the deal we strike.’133         
The following day, the two sides reached an agreement. The final deal was 
extremely favourable to the British, more so than the Trident C4 agreement.134 Britain 
would have to pay an overheads charge on the same percentage basis as the C4 
agreement, something Wade-Gery acknowledged ‘was practically unavoidable under US 
law.’135 However, the US would use part of this payment to set up a project liaison office 
that would advise British companies on how to tender for contracts. The administration 
waived the facilities charge, estimated at $51 million, which was part of the C4 deal. US 
officials were also ‘reasonably forthcoming’ in response to British concerns about 
offsets.136 In addition to ‘helpful language’ in the main exchange letters, the US 
negotiators also offered a further side letter from Caspar Weinberger that, whilst not for 
publication, ‘would not be confidential and could be freely drawn on in public e.g. in 
briefing British industrialists.’137 The two documents would make it clear that 
competitive British firms were eligible for sub-contracts across the breadth of the Trident 
programme.138 Therefore, this deal would negate the arguments of some potential 
                                                          
131Ibid 
132Ibid. 
133Ibid. 
134See TNA, DEFE 25/325, Henderson to Muskie, 30 Sept. 1980; TNA, DEFE 25/325, Christopher to 
Henderson, 30 Sept. 1980. 
135TNA, PREM 19/694, Wade-Gery to Coles, ‘Trident’, 26 Feb. 1982. 
136Ibid. 
137Ibid. 
138TNA, CAB 130/1182, ‘Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy, United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence’, 2 March 1982. 
26 
 
opponents to Trident D5 who would argue that the system was too costly and would take 
valuable jobs away from British manufacturing. Moreover, with the possibility of 
lucrative contracts for British industry, the American offer made the deal much harder 
for any future Labour government to cancel.  
The Reagan administration also agreed to Britain paying a fixed R&D levy 
equivalent to $116 million in fiscal 1982 dollars. This fixed amount insulated Britain from 
any escalation in the development costs of the D5. Moreover, the sum of $116 million was 
a very generous concession from the administration. The charge was limited as though 
the British had stayed with the C4 and the original 1980 five percent formula had been 
applied. Wade-Gery subsequently thought these concessions were ‘a significant 
improvement on the terms of the C4 agreement.’139 
In the end, the British received this deal without many significant concessions on 
their part. On Belize, British negotiators, by describing their training plans in more detail, 
‘were able to avoid offering specific commitments.’140 The ‘lever’ that secured the 
concession on the R&D levy was the decision to reprieve the naval assault ships Fearless 
and Intrepid, as well as the offer of a private letter from Nott to Weinberger, that 
administration officials could show to members of Congress. This letter would clarify the 
British ‘intention of retaining the ships until the end of the decade and deploying them at 
intervals outside the NATO area.’141 British officials did not tell their US counterparts that 
they had already taken the decision to retain these vessels on other grounds.142  
 
Conclusion  
British negotiators were adept at using their limited resources – alongside the Reagan 
administration’s concerns about their defence budget and the political instability of the 
Thatcher government – to secure this favourable deal. The British believed that 
Thatcher’s personal relationship with the President was central to securing the US 
concessions.143 Yet the skill of British negotiators, or the Thatcher-Reagan relationship, 
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does not fully explain the eventual deal. The US officials were also clearly good 
negotiators, and they had a clear strategy from the outset to secure a series of ‘quids’ from 
the British in the administration’s areas of concern. Whether or not the British planned 
to retain Fearless and Intrepid, that the UK did so meant the White House largely achieved 
its aims. However, given their concurrent concern with building the conventional and 
nuclear forces of the ‘West’, as well as its fear of the growth of the anti-nuclear left in 
Britain and the Labour Party, the administration was never going to extort the Thatcher 
government in exchange for reductions. Moreover, the Americans secured concessions 
that, whilst not financially positive, were politically priceless.  
The Thatcher government received an extremely favourable deal because of the 
convergence of US-UK interests. The deal demonstrated the financial price the Reagan 
administration was willing to pay for the political and military support of a Conservative 
Britain. The US government once again demonstrated its party political preferences.144 
The deal was an inducement from the administration to bolster Britain’s nuclear and 
conventional forces, secure the long-term future of these forces, and attempt to limit the 
commitment’s effect on Britain’s wider economic situation, thus stemming one aspect of 
the left’s criticism of the deal. As Richard Perle, a senior official at the Pentagon, later 
remarked, the Reagan White House believed that the Trident D5 agreement was ‘one 
more arrow in the quiver.’145 However, they wanted this ‘quiver’ to take a certain form. 
As such, at the same time as wishing to strike a favourable deal with the British, the 
Americans viewed the negotiations as an opportunity to get as much assistance as 
possible in their particular areas of concern. Ergo, Washington employed the US-UK 
nuclear relationship as a tool to secure the wider defence interests of the US and the 
Western alliance. Moreover, the Reagan administration utilised the relationship as a 
means to further its ideological aim to counter the perceived threat of the Soviet Union 
and a vocal left in Europe. As such, due to the convergence of US-UK interests, and despite 
the financial and political pressures to the contrary, with the assistance of the Reagan 
administration Britain remained a nuclear power. In this way, the Trident D5 agreement 
was not a foregone conclusion, which owed its completion to long-standing nuclear co-
operation or the reductive logic of ‘deterrence’ in the Cold War era. Instead, the 
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agreement was a continuation of the close but not preordained nature of the US-UK 
nuclear relationship, one that has been renegotiated, according to the varying political, 
strategic and economic interests of both parties continually over its existence.146 
The previously opaque story of the Trident D5 negotiations contained within this 
article makes an important contribution to current debates on Trident renewal. It 
demonstrates that there is an entrenched belief amongst the British political elite that an 
‘independent deterrent’ is necessary for Britain’s security. Accordingly, owing to Britain’s 
inferiority in nuclear R&D, this creates a dependency on the US to supply the system. 
Combined, these two aspects of British nuclear policy led to a far greater US influence 
over British defence policy through the Trident D5 agreement than has previously been 
acknowledged. 
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